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Abstract 
This work analyses the impact of  the reduction of  the tax discrimination between debt and 
equity on corporate capital structure decisions. For this we used an exogenous variation in 
Belgian tax legislation in 2006, called Notional Interest Deduction (NID), which consist of  
the introduction of  a tax deduction for equity. To study the impact of  this measure on cor-
porate leverage we use a difference-in-difference regression which compares the evolution 
of  the leverage ratio of  the treatment and control group before and after the introduction 
of  the NID. In addition, we used panel data and the estimator GLS cross-section weights. 
The data was collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream and sample includes Belgian 
(treatment group) and French (control group) companies for the period 2002 to 2011. The 
main results show that a more equal treatment of  debt and equity change the corporate 
capital structure decisions, reducing leverage. This reduction is driven by a decrease in debt, 
principally due to a decrease in short-term debt, and not by an increase of  assets. This result 
indicates that the reduction of  corporate leverage is more likely to be driven by the NID. 
 
Keywords 
Allowance for Corporate Equity; Corporate capital structure; Corporate tax reform; No-
tional interest deduction 
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Resumo 
Este trabalho analisa o impacto da redução da discriminação fiscal entre dívida e capital nas 
decisões de estrutura de capital das empresas. Para tal, utilizamos uma variação exógena na 
legislação fiscal belga, em 2006, designada de Notional Interest Deduction (NID) e que con-
sistiu na introdução de uma dedução fiscal para o capital. Para avaliar o impacto desta medida 
na alavancagem das empresas utilizamos uma regressão de difference-in-difference que compara 
a evolução do rácio de alavancagem do grupo de tratamento e do grupo de controlo, antes e 
após a introdução do NID. Além disso, usamos dados em painel e um estimador GLS cross-
section weights. Os dados utilizados foram recolhidos na Thomson Reuters Datastream para 
empresas belgas (grupo de tratamento) e francesas (grupo de controlo) para o período de 
2002 a 2011. Os resultados principais mostram que um tratamento mais igualitário da dívida 
e do capital altera as decisões de estrutura de capital das empresas, diminuindo a alavancagem. 
Essa diminuição é impulsionada por uma redução da dívida, essencialmente devido à redução 
da dívida de curto prazo, e não pelo aumento dos ativos, o que torna mais provável que a 
redução da alavancagem seja impulsionada pela introdução do NID. 
 
Palavras-Chave: 
Allowance for Corporate Equity; Estrutura de capital; Notional interest deduction; Reforma 
fiscal corporativa 
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1. Introduction 
This work investigates whether the relative reduction of  the tax discrimination between debt 
and equity has an impact on corporate capital structure. The subject of  capital structure is 
particularly important because companies need resources to finance their investments and, 
consequently, they need to find the best finance option between debt and equity. This subject 
was originally studied by Modigliani e Miller (1958) who analysed the ways in which the com-
pany is financed and concluded that the type of  financing does not influence its value. How-
ever, this theory was widely criticized because it was based on unrealistic assumptions, which 
led to its reformulation theory through the inclusion of  taxes. In these new conditions, Mo-
digliani e Miller (1963) have shown that taxes affect the capital structure, given that most tax 
systems consider the interests of  debt as deductible costs for tax purpose, while this is not 
the case for dividends. In this way, it is more favourable for companies to use debt financing 
to finance their investment. After these works, the subject of  corporate capital structure has 
been intensely debated in the world of  corporate finance and the impact of  taxes on capital 
structure is one of  its old questions studied. 
On the other hand, tax deductibility of  interest expenses on debt may led to firms with 
excessive leverage, increasing the bankruptcy risk and their vulnerability in times of  crisis.  
The recent financial crisis of  2008 showed the great fragility of  the businesses, which led 
government authorities to give more importance to the reduction of  leverage. Thus, fiscal 
reforms that intent to reduction the discrimination between debt and equity would help com-
panies achieve an optimal capital structure without being exposed to higher risks in time of  
crisis (Zeitun et al (2017)). On that account, it is important to study the measures that try to 
align the benefits of  debt and equity since they can also act as a tool to reduce leverage. 
Therefore, the aim of  this study is to analyse the impact of  reducing the tax discrimination 
between debt and equity on the capital structure decisions of  companies. For this we will use 
an exogenous change in the Belgian tax legislation in 2006 whose aim was to reduce the 
corporate leverage through a variation in the tax treatment of  equity. This change was called 
the Notional Interest Deduction (NID) and led to the reduction the relative tax advantage 
of  debt by creating a tax deduction based on the application of  a fictitious interest on equity. 
In the definition of  the empirical model, we use the difference-in-difference setup, which 
compares the evolution of  the leverage ratio of  a group of  Belgian companies that were 
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subject to the change in tax legislation with a group of  control companies where the legisla-
tion did not change. For the empirical analysis we used panel data and the estimator Gener-
alized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights. The sample is composed of  accounting 
information of  Belgian (treatment group) and French (control group) non-financial compa-
nies collected on Thomson Datastream and macroeconomic information collect on World 
Bank for the period 2002 to 2011.  
This study contributes, on the one hand, to the literature on the impact of  taxes on the capital 
structure and, on the other hand, to the literature that studies the implications of  measures 
to reduce tax discrimination between debt and equity.  Frist, we analyse the effect of  the NID 
on capital structure choice to Belgian listed firms and extend the period of  analysis from 
2002 to 2011, which allows us to study the impact of  the crisis on capital structure. Second, 
the implementation of  this equity tax reform in Belgium, unlike other tax reforms, includes 
most of  the basic and important features of  the theoretical ACE system proposed by Dev-
ereux, M., Freeman, H. (1991), approaching a neutral tax system. Therefore, the study of  
NID implementation is an opportunity to empirically test this tax system proposed by theo-
retical literature. Third, the previous literature on the impact of  taxes on capital structure 
focuses essentially on tax rate changes, but this study focuses on a direct policy toll. Thus, it 
provides important information for countries with high corporate leverage and to their reg-
ulators who are considering new policy measures to reduce leverage ratios. 
The main results of  this study show that the reduction of  the tax discrimination between 
debt and equity have a significant impact on the corporate capital structure decisions. Thus, 
the introduction of  the NID in Belgium have a negative impact on corporate leverage due 
to the reduction in debt attractiveness. Subsequently, we also analyse the factors that caused 
the change in leverage ratio. This analysis is important because companies can lower their 
leverage ratio by decreasing debt or increasing assets. The results indicate that the change in 
leverage is driven by a decline in debt, mainly due to the reduction of  short-erm debt, and 
not by an increase of  assets. Finally, we do additional robustness tests to evaluate if  the main 
results do not depend on the matching procedure or the sample, which confirmed the find-
ings. 
The remainder of  the dissertation is structured as follows. Section 2 provide the principal 
characteristics of  the Belgian Notional Interest Deduction. Section 3 presents a summary 
review of  the main related literature on NID and capital structure and develop our 
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hypotheses. In section 4, we describe the sample and present the variables definition and the 
methodology used. Section 5 describes our empirical results and provide some robustness 
checks. Finally, in section 6 we present the conclusion of  our findings.      
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2. The Belgian Notional Interest Deduction 
The generality of  the tax systems around the world allows the deductibility for interest, while 
dividends are not. This situation can cause distortions in the financing decisions. Thus, these 
corporate tax systems favour debt financing over equity financing and may lead to excessive 
leverage by companies.  
To mitigate this problem Devereux and Freeman (1991) proposed the implementation of  a 
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) based on the theorical concept of  neutral tax system 
developed by Boadway and Bruce (1984) . Ideally an ACE system make firms indifferent 
regarding the debt-equity choice, at least for tax propose, because allows firms to deduct a 
notional interest rate on equity as well as an interest on debt (Schepens, 2016). Furthermore, 
an advantage of  this system is it to be insensitive to the method of  tax depreciation and 
inflation. For example, if  the firm chose an accelerated depreciation method for tax purpose, 
the book value of  assets decreases and, consequently, decreases the base on which ACE is 
calculated. Thus, the reduction in the ACE benefit is exactly offset by the benefits of  accel-
erated depreciation (Geert Van & Tom Van, 2013). However, the main obstacle to the im-
plementation of  this type of  system is a budgetary cost, estimated at around 15 percent of  
current revenue for a selection of  advanced economies, according to De Mooij (2012). Some 
countries, both inside and outside Europe, have introduced an allowance for corporate eq-
uity, for example Croatia (1994-2000), Brazil (1996 to the present), Italy (1997-2003, having 
adopted again the system in 2011 to the present), Austria (2000-2004), Belgium (2006 to the 
present), Portugal (2008 to the present), Latvia (2009-2013), Liechtenstein (2011 to the pre-
sent), Cyprus (2015 to the present), Turkey (2015 to the present) and Malta (2017 to the 
present)1, although the systems were implemented differently for different countries. In ad-
dition, Denmark has proposed an ACE in 2017 budget to be introduced in 2019. 
                                                         
1 Several studies focus on the application of  the ACE system in these countries. Keen and King (2002) analyses 
the application of  the ACE in Croatia. The system implemented in this country includes most of  the charac-
teristics of  the theoretical model as developed by Devereux and Freeman (1991) as well the system implemented 
in Belgium. The Belgian system has been largely studied, for example by Andries, Cools, and Van Uytbergen 
(2017), Schepens (2016), Geert Van and Tom Van (2013), Kestens, van Cauwenbergeo, and Christiaens (2012) 
and Princen (2012). However, the system implemented in Brazil has different characteristics from the others. 
Its application is limited to dividends paid out to shareholders. Klemm (2007) analysed the impact of  applying 
this system and found a significant change of  the capital structure of  Brazilian companies. Finally, Austria and 
Italy had more restricted variants of  the standard ACE system. Bordignon, Giannini, and Panteghini (2001) 
studied the application of  the system in Italy. 
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In Belgium, an Allowance for Corporate Equity was applied since 1 January 2006 (fiscal year 
2007) by introducing a notional interest rate on equity called the Notional Interest Deduction 
(NID). The eligible firms for the application to this measure are the ones with tax presence 
in Belgium, which includes Belgian firms and foreign firms with subsidiaries in Belgium. 
The introduction of  the NID was boosted by the prohibition of  the existence of  coordina-
tion centres by decisions of  the European Commission in 2003. Until then, Belgium had an 
advantageous tax legislation for multinational coordination centres, which made it a privi-
leged tax destination for multinational firms and discriminated against Belgian firms. There-
fore, the NID partly replaced the tax benefit for the multinational coordination centres. The 
two most important aims of  this tax reform were to reduce the effective corporate tax rate, 
increasing the attractiveness of  Belgium to foreign investors, and to reduce the traditional 
tax discrimination between debt and capital financing. As a result, it is expectable this reform 
encourages companies to reduce debt financing and increase capital financing, improving 
corporate solvency. 
The amount of  the tax deduction is calculated as a notional tax rate on the firm’s adjusted 
equity. This notional interest rate is set annually by the Belgian Government and is equal to 
the average 10-year Belgian government bond rate of  the second year prior to the current 
fiscal year2. In case of  small and medium-sized enterprises, the notional interest rate is in-
creased by 0.5% than standard rate. After calculating the amount of  the NID, this is deducted 
from the taxable base for the calculation of  corporate taxes. However, when a firm has an 
insufficient tax base to fully use the planned deduction, the unrealized part can be carried 
forward to the following seven years. Thus, the deduction corresponds an estimated equity 
cost and not to an actual equity cost, i.e. the return to shareholders (Schepens, 2016). 
                                                         
2 For example, for the fiscal years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, the applicable notional interest rate 
was equal to 3,442%, 3,781%, 4,307%, 4,473%, 3,8% and 3,425%, respectively. 
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3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.1. NID and Capital Structure 
There are theoretical reasons that point out taxes affect the choices of  the firm’s capital 
structure (Miller, 1977; Modigliani & Miller, 1963). These theoretical studies inspired a set of  
empirical studies (e.g. Faccio and Xu (2015) and Rajan and Zingales (1995)), which estab-
lished a solid statistical connection between taxes and capital structure choices. 
The main goal of  our study is to investigate the effect of  NID application in Belgian com-
panies. This application consists of  the deduction of  a notional interest rate on capital, which 
allows the reduction of  the tax discrimination between debt and equity financing. According 
to trade-off  theory of  corporate capital structure, companies balance the costs and benefits 
related to debt3, being the tax deductibility of  debt one of  the most important benefits. 
Therefore, the NID decreases the cost of  equity and, consequently, reinforces the relative 
attractiveness of  capital financing in comparison to debt financing (Geert Van & Tom Van, 
2013). Thus, tax benefits of  debt decrease, and companies incorporate less debt into their 
capital structure. 
Since the introduction of  the NID, some empirical studies have focused on the implications 
of  the NID in Belgium. For example, Kestens et al. (2012) studied if  the introduction of  the 
NID induced changes in the leverage ratios of  Belgian small and medium sized enterprises. 
They concluded the notional interest deduction caused a decrease in average simulated mar-
ginal tax rate and significantly reduced corporate leverage ratios. Geert Van and Tom Van 
(2013) also focused on small and medium enterprises and found an improvement in solvency 
but without a significant change in leverage. Another set of  researchers used the difference-
in-difference method, which compares the change in leverage of  the treated group with the 
change in leverage of  the group control, namely Princen (2012) and Schepens (2016). The 
first one compared the Belgium group reaction non-financial firms with a group of  French 
and German firms and found a significant reduction in corporate leverage. Finally, Schepens 
(2016) studied the impact of  the NID on capital structure of  Belgian banks compared to a 
set of  European banks and found a significant increase in the capital ratio of  Belgium banks. 
                                                         
3 For more details on the trade-off  theory see section 3.2. 
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Therefore, we expect the introduction of  the NID to have a negative impact on the leverage 
of  Belgian firms. We will test the following hypothesis: 
H1: The application of  the NID has a negative impact on the leverage of  Belgian 
firms.  
3.2. Capital Structure Theories and Determinants 
The theme of  capital structure was originally studied by Modigliani and Miller (1958). They 
considered a set of  assumptions, such as a perfect market and the absence of  taxes, and 
concluded the way how the firm is financed does not influence its value. However, this theory 
was widely criticized for being based on a set of  unrealistic assumptions. These criticisms led 
Modigliani e Miller in 1963 to reformulate their model by considering an economy in the 
presence of  taxes where there is the possibility of  tax deduction of  financial charges with 
debt. In these new conditions, the authors concluded the tax deduction of  interest, but not 
of  dividends, encourages firms to increase the use of  debt to finance their investments.  
Thus, the value of  the firm is greater the higher the level of  debt. 
Following this theory, many studies have been developed and inspired different theoretical 
perspectives on the determinants of  corporate capital structure. The two predominant the-
ories in this area were the trade-off  theory and the pecking order theory. 
The trade-off  theory considers an optimal capital structure which reflects a balance between 
the costs and benefits of  debt compared to equity (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Miller, 1977). 
Therefore, firms choose their capital structure considering the trade-off  between the benefits 
and costs of  using the debt, in other words they take into account the value of  interest tax 
shields and the cost of  bankruptcy or financial embarrassment expected with the increase in 
debt. If  on the one hand, firms increasing debt will increase tax benefits, which should in-
crease their value, on the other hand, financial costs and the risk of  bankruptcy also increase 
triggered by this increased debt, eventually reaching the equilibrium (i.e. optimal capital struc-
ture) where the value of  the company is maximized. 
In contrast to the trade-off  theory, in pecking order theory, it is not possible to establish a 
good relation between debt and equity and does not admit the existence of  an optimal capital 
structure. This theory defends the existence of  a hierarchy of  preference by type of  financ-
ing. First, firms prefer internal resources available to finance new investments. When 
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internally generated funds become insufficient, they use external funds in the following or-
der: first debt and finally equity (S. C. Myers, 1984; Stewart C. Myers & Majluf, 1984). This 
hierarchy is justified by the existence of  asymmetric information between firm managers 
(insiders) and outside investors. According to this theory, outside investors have less infor-
mation about future prospects of  the company than insiders, therefore outside investors may 
underestimate the true value of  the firm and, consequently, internal resources are preferable 
to financing new investments. 
The different theories of  capital structure suggest a set of  firm-specific factors that may 
affect the choice between debt and equity, and many investigations focus on the effect of  
these different firm-specific determinants on the capital structure, for example: Faccio and 
Xu (2015); Harrison and Widjaja (2014); Alves and Francisco (2015); Zeitun, Temimi, and 
Mimouni (2017); Akbar, Rehman, and Ormrod (2013); Rajan and Zingales (1995); Titman 
and Wessels (1988). These firm-specific determinants considered are: profitability, tangibility, 
grow opportunities, size and not-debt tax shield, discussed below. 
Profitability 
Both theories, trade-off  and pecking order, argue that profitability affects corporate financ-
ing decisions. 
The trade-off  theory holds profitability companies should be more leveraged. The more 
profitable companies have a lower risk of  bankruptcy and may resort to a higher level of  
debt to reduce the tax payments. Thus, according to this theory there is a positive relationship 
between profitability and leverage. 
In its turn, the pecking order theory suggests a hierarchy by types of  financing where firms 
prefer internal funds to finance their new investments and only use debt when they are in-
sufficient. Thus, companies with more internally generated funds will be less leveraged be-
cause they avoid funding through external capital to prevent problems of  asymmetric infor-
mation. Therefore, profitable companies will have less leverage, i.e. the pecking order theory 
suggests a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
Most empirical studies also support a negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
(Akbar et al., 2013; Alves & Francisco, 2015; Faccio & Xu, 2015; Geert Van & Tom Van, 
2013; Harrison & Widjaja, 2014; Kestens et al., 2012; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Zeitun et al., 
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2017). In line with this, we expect a negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
and, consequently, we will test the following hypothesis: 
H2: Profitability has a negative impact on leverage. 
Tangibility 
The predominant type of  assets in a company affects in some way its capital structure choice. 
The trade-off  theory supports a positive relationship between tangible assets and leverage 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988). In the case of  bankruptcy, tangible assets 
are generally more likely to have greater residual value than intangible assets. This makes 
tangible assets a good collateral for debt contracts and works as an instrument that mitigates 
the risk which occurs in shareholder and bondholder conflict. Thus, companies with higher 
tangible assets has a lower risk of  lending and creditors require a lower risk premium, which 
allows access to a higher level of  debt. This positive relationship is supported by Geert Van 
and Tom Van (2013), Kestens et al. (2012), Faccio and Xu (2015), Harrison and Widjaja 
(2014), Alves and Francisco (2015), Zeitun et al. (2017) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
However, the pecking order theory predicts firms with less tangible assets are more subject 
to information asymmetry problems and, consequently, they have more underinvestment 
problems (Harris & Raviv, 1991). This makes debt financing more attractive.  Thus, this the-
ory expects tangibility have a negative impact on leverage. 
Therefore, we expect a positive relation between tangibility and leverage and we will test the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: Tangibility has a positive impact on leverage. 
Growth opportunities 
The trade-off  theory defends companies with high grow opportunities usually present higher 
financial distress and agency costs between shareholders and bondholders because these 
companies have higher asymmetric information problems (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman 
& Wessels, 1988; Zeitun et al., 2017). This situation causes an underinvestment which can be 
mitigated by reducing deb. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between growth op-
portunities and debt. 
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In otherwise, firms with high grow opportunities need large amounts of  funding and internal 
resources may not be sufficient to finance investment opportunities. Therefore, these firms 
may have to resort to external resources. Given the pecking order theory, when the firms 
need external financing first issue debt and then capital (Geert Van & Tom Van, 2013; S. C. 
Myers, 1984). In this way, growth opportunities are positively related to leverage. 
The empirical studies that analyse the relationship between growth opportunities and lever-
age have contradictory results, while Faccio and Xu (2015), González (2015) and Akbar et al. 
(2013) find a positive association between the two variables,  Harrison and Widjaja (2014), 
Alves and Francisco (2015), Zeitun et al. (2017) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) conclude 
growth opportunities are negatively related to leverage. 
In conclusion, we will consider a positive sign supported by the previous theoretical exposi-
tion. In this way, we will test the following hypothesis: 
H4: Growth opportunities have a positive impact on leverage. 
Size 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest firm size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of  
bankruptcy.  
Larger companies tend to be more diversified and to have less volatile earnings. Moreover, 
these firms are generally less likely to bankruptcy and can obtain financing easier with lower 
financial costs (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Zeitun et al., 2017). According to this, the trade-off  
theory consider larger companies will be more leveraged. 
In its turn, the pecking order theory also suggest the existence of  a positive relationship 
between size and leverage. Large companies are characterized by lower asymmetric infor-
mation problems, providing more information to market players and, as a result, obtain more 
easily new financing from creditors (Geert Van & Tom Van, 2013). 
The authors Princen (2012) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) found inconclusive results. 
(Princen, 2012) uses two measures of  leverage (book leverage and financial leverage), finding 
a negative relation for the former and a positive relation for the latter. In addition, all coun-
tries analysed by Rajan and Zingales (1995) have a positive relationship between size and 
leverage, except to Germany where this relation is negative. However, many studies found a 
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positive relationship between these two variables (Alves & Francisco, 2015; Faccio & Xu, 
2015; Zeitun et al., 2017). Considering the results described above, we will test the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: Size has a positive impact on leverage. 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) 
The non-debt tax shield can be considered as a direct substitute for the tax benefits of  debt 
financing. To examine this proposition, Geert Van and Tom Van (2013) and Titman and 
Wessels (1988) use depreciation and amortization as a proxy for non-debt tax shield. As 
depreciations and amortization reduces taxable income, companies with larger non-debt tax 
shields use less debt in their capital structure. de Miguel and Pindado (2001) prove this neg-
ative relationship for a panel of  Spanish companies. 
However, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Geert Van and Tom Van (2013) could not confirm 
the relevance of  the effect of  depreciations and amortizations on leverage. On the other 
hand, Princen (2012) and Faccio and Xu (2015) conclude firms with higher level of  NDTS 
have a higher level of  leverage in their capital structure. The last result is consistent with 
depreciations and amortizations as a proxy for assets. Thus, firms with high depreciations 
and amortizations should replace their assets more quickly, as a result, they need more debt 
to finance the replacement of  assets (Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984). 
Finally, we expect a negative impact of  NDTS on leverage. So, we will test the following 
hypothesis: 
H6: NDTS has a negative impact on leverage. 
3.3. Crisis and Capital Structure 
The financial crisis of  2008 was a global crisis which revealed a set of  weaknesses that should 
not be neglected, namely the deregulation of  financial markets and the deficiency of  super-
visory systems. 
As most corporate income tax systems admit the deductibility of  interest deduction, this 
favour debt financing. This encourages companies to increase the leverage ratio and may lead 
to excessive leverage. However, this situation makes increase the bankruptcy risk of  the firms 
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and their vulnerability in periods of  crisis.  Thus, fiscal reforms that align the benefits of  
debt and equity would help attain an optimal capital structure without firms being exposed 
to greater risks during the crisis (Zeitun et al., 2017). 
The recent financial crisis has been exposed to several empirical studies which suggest a 
significant impact of  the crisis on corporate capital structure decisions, but they found evi-
dence in both directions. Akbar et al. (2013) and Zeitun et al. (2017) found a negative impact 
and Alves and Francisco (2015) and González (2015) obtained a positive impact of  the crisis 
on leverage ratio due to the increase in debt essentially by the increase of  the short-term 
debt. If  on the one hand, financial crises create conditions for supply shocks with a reduction 
in the availability and an increase in the cost of  debt, which leads to the reduction of  debt in 
corporate capital structure, on the other hand, crisis can have the opposite effect, increasing 
debt, because companies may need more financing due to lack of  internal resources. Thus, 
the exact effects of  the crisis on the capital structure of  companies are partly unknown. 
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4. Sample, Variables and Methodology 
4.1. Sample 
The sample was constructed by firms-specific balance sheet data from the Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. We used Belgian firms listed on the Euronext Liffe Brussels (treatment group) 
and French firms listed on the Euronext Liffe Paris (control group) for the period from 2002 
to 2011. The sample period is divided into a pre-treatment period of  four years (2002-2005) 
and a post-treatment period of  six years (2006-2011), of  which the last four years include 
the post-crisis period (2008-2011). Thus, the initial sample include 2 281 firms with data for 
DS Mnemonic Code (310 Belgian and 1 971 French). 
From the initial sample, we excluded: all companies without information for Sic Code; all 
financial companies (Sic Code 60-67) because they have specific financial behaviour as also 
a unique legislation; and all companies who do not have complete information for pre-treat-
ment period4 and for at least four years for the post-treatment period. Subsequently, we win-
sorized all variables at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the impact of  outliers. As a result, 
the final sample covered 521 firms (66 Belgian and 455 French) with 5 210 firm-years obser-
vations (660 for Belgium and 4 550 for France). 
Finally, the macroeconomic variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators 
database at the World Bank. 
4.2. Variables 
The dependent variable in the study is the leverage ratio (Leverage) defined as total debt 
divided by total assets. In a second analysis, we used the logarithm of  total assets (Ln(Total 
Assets)), the logarithm of  total debt (Ln(Total Debt)), the logarithm of  long-term debt 
(Ln(LTD)) and the logarithm of  short-term debt (Ln(STD)) as the dependent variable to 
analyse the underlying factors of  the change in leverage ratios. 
We used two types of  explanatory variables: main variables and control variables. 
The main explanatory variables of  the analysis are defined as follows: Treated is a dummy 
                                                         
4 It is necessary to have complete information for the pre-treatment period to be able to do the matching 
procedure. 
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variable equal to one for all Belgian firms and zero otherwise, indicating the treatment group; 
Post is a dummy variable equal to one for the post-treatment period (2006-2011), zero oth-
erwise; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one for the post-crisis period (2008-2011), zero 
otherwise. 
Finally, we used control variables at macroeconomic and firm level. Thus, taking into account 
the literature on determinants of  capital structure, we add the following firm-level variables: 
profitability (PROF) is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortiza-
tion (EBITDA) divided by total assets; tangibility (TANG) is defined as property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets; size (SIZE) defined as the logarithm of  total assets; non 
debt tax shield (NDTS), defined as depreciation, depletion and amortization divided by total 
assets. In addition, we have also introduced macroeconomics control variables to control for 
potential differences in economic development at the country level, such as: GDP per capita 
(GDPpc), GDP growth per capita (GDPpc growth) and Inflation as measured by the con-
sumer price index. Finally, we use industry dummy variables based on two-digit SIC codes to 
control the industry-specifics characteristics. 
4.3. Methodology 
For the main analysis in this study, we used a difference-in-difference setup, which compares 
change in the capital structure of  the Belgian companies with change in the capital structure 
of  a similar control group, where tax legislation did not change. The base specification is as 
follows: 
Leverage
i,t
=α+β
1
*Postt+β2*Treatedi*Postt+β3*Crisist+β4*Xi,t+εi,t  
where i represents the individual companies, t the year, Xi,t represents the set of  control 
variables and the remaining variables have the above meaning. These set of  control variables 
including profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities, size, NDTS, GDP per capita, GDP 
growth per capita and inflation. The coefficient of  interest for the main analysis is the coef-
ficient β2 which indicate the impact of  the introduction of  the NID. 
We estimate the model by using a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights to 
avoid possible heteroscedasticity problems due to the use of  panel data. 
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Difference-in-difference matching 
Ideally, the impact of  a tax reform would be studied by comparing the changes in the relevant 
variable before and after the reform for a group of  companies in the presence of  the tax 
reform and for the same group of  companies in absence of  this reform. However, the study 
is not possible to do in these terms. Considering the tax reform is exogenous, we can deter-
mine a treatment group, which is composed of  Belgian companies affected by the reform, 
and a control group, which is constituted by companies of  a country where the fiscal legis-
lation did not change. This control group is a proxy to the Belgian companies if  there had 
been no change in legislation. We used French companies as a control group because France, 
unlike Belgium, has a traditional tax system, which allows the tax deduction of  interest ex-
penses but not the capital cost of  equity. In addition, France did not have a major tax reforms 
around 2006, is a neighboring country of  Belgium, both countries belong to the same eco-
nomic space and share the same currency, which makes them more likely to be exposed to 
the similar shocks. In this way, we will use a difference-in-difference identification strategy 
to ensures that the estimates obtained will not be influenced by permanent differences be-
tween the treatment and the control group or by shared trends (Schepens, 2016).  
To obtain reliable estimates by the difference-in-difference method is necessary verify two 
fundamental assumptions. The first assumption states capital structure trends of  the treat-
ment and control group should be similar in the pre-treatment period. This assumption is 
called a parallel trend and implies in the absence of  treatment the mean result for both groups 
would have followed same trend over time. The second assumption states both groups have 
the same characteristics in the pre-treatment period.  As a result, according Princen (2012), 
the significant differences between the two groups are attributed to the tax reform. Thus, the 
credibility of  the results obtained by difference-in-difference methodology is dependent on 
the control group used and whether it accurately represents the treatment group in the ab-
sence of  the treatment. 
To verify the above assumptions, we use the nearest neighbor matching procedure to con-
struct the control group. This procedure states for a given treatment company is selected a 
control company whose propensity score matching value is the closest of  the treatment com-
pany (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
The propensity score matching is estimated using a probit regression for the full 2005 sample 
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where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for Belgian companies. In order to 
make more probable to verify the first assumption, we include the 2004 and 2005 leverage 
ratio as explanatory variables. In addition, we also include a set of  control variables related 
to firm specific characteristics, namely: tangibility, profitability, size, growth opportunities, 
NDTS and industry dummy variables based on two-digit Sic Code. This set of  control vari-
ables ensure that treatment and control group have similar characteristics and to make more 
likely the second assumption. At the end, for each Belgian company are selected three French 
companies with identical characteristics according to their propensity score.  This matching 
is made with replacement5, which means a French company can be select for several Belgian 
companies. Thus, the final sample covers 66 Belgian companies and 198 French companies. 
                                                         
5 Matching with replacement consists of  the combination of  each treatment observation with the closest con-
trol observation, thus a control observation can be repeatedly used. Therefore, on the one hand, the order in 
which the treated observations are matched has no effect on the formation of  the matched pairs, which may 
reduce bias and allows for more successful matches. On the other hand, matching with replacement can de-
crease the representativeness of  the control group and increase the sampling variance. However, this problem 
may be mitigated by increasing the sample size using a “one-to-many” correspondence, where one treatment 
observation is matched to many control observations (Austin, 2014; Shipman, Swanquist, & Whited, 2017). 
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5. Empirical results 
In this section we present the empirical results of  the study. Initially, the univariate results 
are presented. Subsequently, using a difference-in-difference approach, we analyse the differ-
ences in leverage ratios between Belgian and control companies to study the impact of  the 
NID on capital structure. Finally, additional robustness tests are performed to verify the 
consistency of  the results obtained. 
5.1. Univariate results 
The descriptive statists of  the main variables of  the analysis are presented in Table 1.  The 
Panel A of  Table 1 illustrate the impact of  the matching procedure, showing summary sta-
tistics for the pre-treatment period (2002-2005) for Belgian companies, the full sample of  
French companies and the selected control group. Thus, it is possible verify that the parallel 
trends assumption is breached when considering full sample of  French companies because 
the leverage ratio of  the full sample of  French companies is significantly different from the 
leverage ratio of  the Belgian companies, and the same is true for all other characteristics. For 
example, treatment group companies are significantly more leveraged (26% versus 23%), 
which shows that control group companies have a more balanced capital structure.  In case 
of  the specific characteristics of  the companies, profitability, weight of  the tangible assets in 
total assets and size of  the Belgian companies tend to be significant higher to French com-
panies. These significant differences justify the use of  a matching method to properly apply 
the difference-in-difference strategy. 
However, for the results of  the difference-in-difference model to be reliable is necessary to 
evaluate the success of  the matching procedure. For this, we will use two indicators used by 
Schepens (2016): “% change bias” and P-values of  a T-test. 
The first indicator shows the bias change after matching, where bias is defined by Rosenbaun 
and Rubin (1985) as the percentage difference of  the means in the treated and non-treated 
groups as a percentage of  the square root of  the average of  the sample variances in the 
treated and non-treated groups. The values of  “Bias full” and “Bias matched” shows a re-
duction in bias between the treatment group and, respectively, the full sample of  French 
companies and the control group. In addition, the “% changes bias” indicator has a positive 
value to all variables which implies a reduction in the bias after matching, showing an
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Table 1:  Impact of the matching procedure and summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics and matching diagnostics for the pre-treatment period (2002-2005) (Panel A) and the summary statistics for the post-treatment 
period (2006-2011) (Panel) B for the main variables used in the study. The first part of Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the Belgian companies (treatment group), 
the second for the full sample of French companies (full sample) and third for the French companies selected for the control group (control group). In relation to the second 
and third parts: the column Diff. shows the value of the difference between, respectively, the mean of full sample or control group and the mean of treatment group; the fifth 
column shows the p-value for the t-test which verifies if, respectively, the average of full sample or control group is equal to the average of the treatment group; the “Bias full” 
and “Bias matched” columns indicate the standardized percentage bias between the treatment group and, respectively, the full sample of French companies and French 
companies selected for the control group. Where bias is defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) as the percentage difference of the means in the treated and non-treated 
groups as a per-centage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups. The last column, % change in bias, shows the percentage 
change in bias after the matching procedure, where a positive value indicates that averages of the treatment and control group are closer after matching. 
Panel A: Matching Procedure diagnostics 
 Treatment group Full sample Control group 
 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff. P-value 
Bias 
full 
N Mean Std. Dev. Diff. P-value 
Bias 
matched 
%change 
in bias  
Leverage 264 0,26 0,19 1820 0,23 0,17 -0,03 0,02 16,71 792 0,27 0,19 0,00 0,84 -1,41 91,54 
Profitability 264 0,13 0,13 1820 0,10 0,12 -0,03 0,00 22,50 792 0,13 0,12 0,00 0,64 -3,16 85,95 
Tangibility 264 0,31 0,21 1820 0,19 0,17 -0,12 0,00 62,65 792 0,30 0,23 -0,01 0,47 5,30 91,54 
Growth oppor-
tunities 
264 0,03 0,22 1820 0,07 0,26 0,03 0,04 -14,27 792 0,07 0,22 0,03 0,05 -13,96 2,18 
Size 264 12,57 1,76 1820 12,04 2,36 -0,52 0,00 25,22 792 12,64 2,29 0,07 0,63 -3,64 85,58 
NDTS 264 0,07 0,04 1820 0,06 0,05 -0,01 0,02 16,95 792 0,06 0,05 -0,01 0,02 17,18 -1,35 
Panel B: Post-treatment summary statistics 
 Treatment group    Control group 
 N Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. N Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Leverage 386 0,23 0,23 0,84 0,00 0,16 1149 0,26 0,24 0,86 0,00 0,19 
Profitability 384 0,12 0,12 0,50 -0,40 0,12 1140 0,12 0,11 0,50 -0,40 0,09 
Tangibility 386 0,29 0,24 0,87 0,00 0,21 1149 0,29 0,27 0,83 0,00 0,22 
Growth opportunities 385 0,06 0,04 1,28 -0,45 0,22 1148 0,07 0,04 1,28 -0,45 0,21 
Size 386 12,89 12,45 18,18 9,23 1,81 1149 13,00 12,89 18,18 7,58 2,27 
NDTS 385 0,05 0,04 0,22 0,00 0,03 1149 0,04 0,04 0,27 0,00 0,03 
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approximation of  the mean between the two group. In the case of  leverage this reduction is 
92% and between 2% and 86% for most remaining variables. The only exception is the case 
of  NDTS for which bias after matching has increased 1%. Finally, the P-values of  a T-test 
on the averages show that the means for the most variables are significantly different when 
comparing the treatment group and the full sample, e.g. profitability, tangibility and size. 
However, after matching procedure, the differences between the variables in the Belgian 
companies and French control companies are less significant. In conclusion, as the variables 
follow a similar trend and characteristics in the pre-treatment period, it is more likely that the 
parallel trend assumption is verified and, consequently, the difference-in-difference estimates 
are more reliable. 
The Panel B of  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the post-treatment period (2006-
2011) for Belgian treatment companies and French control companies. These statistics show 
a reduction in average leverage ratio for both groups, but this reduction is more pronounced 
for Belgian companies (26% to 23% versus 27% to 26%). In addition, Figure 1 present the 
evolution of  the average leverage ratio for Belgian companies and control companies be-
tween 2002 and 2011. This figure shows a similar trend of  the leverage ratio for both group 
during the pre-treatment period and a lower leverage ratio for the Belgian group compared 
to control group in the post-treatment period. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the leverage ratio for the Belgian companies and the control companies over time 
0,15
0,17
0,19
0,21
0,23
0,25
0,27
0,29
0,31
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Belgian companies Control companies
20 
 
5.2. Multivariate results 
It is intended now to evaluate the impact of  the NID on the capital structure of  Belgian 
companies.  Table 2 summarizes the results for difference-in-difference analysis, which com-
pares the leverage ratios of  the Belgian companies with those of  the control group of  French 
companies. Column 1 of  Table 2 shows the results of  base regression. The results show a 
non-significant reduction in leverage in the post-treatment period. However, the coefficient 
of  the interaction term, interest variable, is negative of  -0.0236 and significant at the 1% 
level, which suggests that this reduction was more pronounced for Belgian companies.  This 
indicates that, the leverage ratio for Belgian companies decreased significantly compared with 
one would expect without the tax reform. As the sample period includes the crisis period, in 
Column 2 is added the Crisis variable which capture other shocks related to the crisis that 
have an impact on corporate capital structure. On the one hand, the main result remains, 
and, on the other hand, the coefficient of  the Crisis variable is positive and significant at the 
10% level, indicating the crisis has a positive impact in leverage. 
Next, we add a set of  firm-specific and macroeconomic control variables so that we make 
sure they not change the previous results. The results are presented in Columns 3-4 and show 
that the coefficient of  interest variable continuous negative and significant of  -0.0136 and -
0.0178, respectively. In addition, regarding to the firm-level variables, tangibility, growth op-
portunities and size has a positive and significant impact on leverage and profitability also 
has a significant but negative impact. This provides support for H3, H4, H5 and H2, respec-
tively. This means that companies with more tangible assets, more growth opportunities, 
more total assets and less profitable use more debt than capital. Finally, the results show that 
firms with higher NDTS are more leveraged, which do not give support to H6. A possible 
reason for this result is that depreciations are both a proxy for NDTS and an indicator of  
assets. If  depreciations are high, assets must be replaced more quickly requiring significant 
funding (Bradley et all, 1984). Regarding to the effect of  the crisis, the results of  columns 3 
and 4 show a negative impact of  the crisis on corporate leverage, not significant for the first 
and significant at the 5% level for the second. 
Thus, the results of  Table 2 illustrate that the introduction of  the NID had a significant 
impact on corporate capital structure. This fiscal reform reduced the discrimination between 
debt and equity which allowed the decrease in leverage compared with what would
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Table 2:  Impact of the NID on capital structure 
This table analyses the impact of  the NID in the leverage, using a difference-in-difference strategy for 
Belgian and French data. The dependent variable is Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets. 
Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for Belgian firms and zero otherwise; Post is a dummy variable equal 
to one for the post-treatment period (2006-2011), zero otherwise; interaction term between Treated and Post 
dummies captures the impact of  the NID; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one for the post-crisis period 
(2008-2011), zero otherwise; Profitability (PROF) is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets; Tangibility (TANG) is defined as property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets; Size (SIZE) defined as the logarithm of  total assets; Non debt tax shield (NDTS) is 
defined as depreciation, depletion and amortization divided by total assets; GDP per capita (GDPpc) is meas-
ured by Word Bank, GDP growth per capita (GDPpc growth) is the annual percentage of  GDP per capita 
growth as measured by the World Bank and Inflation is the annual percentage of  inflation in consumer prices 
as measured by the World Bank. The industry dummy variables are based on two-digit SIC codes. The regres-
sions are estimated by Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights. The sample period is 2002-2011. 
Coefficients and standard errors are reported. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively.  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  
Treated * Post -0,0236 *** -0,0237 *** -0,0136 ** -0,0178 *** 
 (0,0057)  (0,0058)  (0,0057)  (0,0060)  
Post -0,0068  -0,0122 ** -0,0134 *** 0,0075  
 (0,0042)  (0,0054)  (0,0050)  (0,0068)  
Crisis   0,0100 * -0,0046  -0,0153 ** 
   (0,0053)  (0,0049)  (0,0064)  
PROF     -0,5259 *** -0,5263 *** 
     (0,0224)  (0,0224)  
TANG     0,2347 *** 0,2372 *** 
     (0,0112)  (0,0111)  
GRO     0,0403 *** 0,0445 *** 
     (0,0101)  (0,0102)  
SIZE     0,0122 *** 0,0124 *** 
     (0,0009)  (0,0009)  
NDTS     0,3508 *** 0,3409 *** 
     (0,0678)  (0,0673)  
Ln(GDP per capita)       -0,0471 *** 
       (0,0177)  
GDP per capita _ growth       -0,0060 *** 
       (0,0016)  
Inflation       0,0118 *** 
       (0,0028)  
Constant 0,2573 *** 0,2567 *** 0,1036 *** 0,5701 *** 
 (0,0124)   (0,0122)   (0,0168)   (0,1827)  
Observations 2591  2591  2578  2578 
 
Number of  firms 264  264  264  264 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0,251  0,255  0,492  0,500 
 
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
22 
 
be expected without the reform. This result is consistent with the theorical prediction. As 
such, reforms that drive the reduction of  the relative tax advantage of  the debt can be used 
to induce a decrease in leverage in counties with high levels of  corporate leverage. 
The results also show contradictory effects on the impact of  the crisis on leverage. However, 
the previous literature is also not unanimous about the effect of  the crisis on corporate cap-
ital structure. 
However, the decrease in leverage may be driven by a decrease in debt as a result of  the 
implementation of  the NID or by an increase in assets promoted by an increase in activity. 
Thus, we investigated the factors that generated the change in leverage ratio and the results 
are presented in Table 3. The first column indicates that the decrease of  leverage ratio is 
driven by a decrease in total debt. The results show that Belgian companies have on average 
19.51%6 less debt during the post-treatment period compared with would one expected had 
the measure not been applied. 
It is to be expected that firms have different reactions to the introduction of  the NID be-
cause they have different corporate strategies concerning debt maturity, for example. The 
total debt contains the long-term and the short-term debt. Therefore, the second and third 
columns consider the logarithm of  the long-term debt (Ln(LTD)) and the logarithm of  the 
short-term debt (Ln(STD)), respectively. The results indicate that the decrease of  the total 
debt is essentially due to the decrease of  the short-term debt. Short-term debt needs to be 
renewed more frequently and transaction costs related to this type of  debt are lower, which 
explains the greater reactivity of  short-term debt to the introduction of  the NID and, con-
sequently, the results obtained (Kestens et al., 2012). 
Finally, Column 4 confirms that the decrease in leverage was not due to an increase in activity 
because it shows that there was a decrease in total assets. Therefore, the results in Table 3 
indicate that the decrease in leverage after the introduction of  the NID is driven by a decrease 
in debt instead of  an increase of  activities, which suggest that the measure served the pur-
pose for which it was introduced. 
                                                         
6 Because the dependent variable is log transformed it is not possible to directly interpret the coefficient of  the 
dummy independent variable. Thus, for a correct interpretation Kennedy (1981) propose the following trans-
formation: p̂=100*( exp(ĉ-0.5*V̂(ĉ)) -1) where p̂ is the percentage change in the dependent variable given a 
change in the dummy variable from zero to one, ?̂? is the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable and  V̂(ĉ) 
is the estimated variance for this coefficient. 
23 
 
Table 3: Leverage ratio components 
 This table reports the factors underlying of  the leverage ratio after the introduction of  the NID. 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 analyze the impact of  the NID on the debt side, using as depend variable the logarithm of  
total debt (Ln(Total Debt)), the logarithm of  long-term debt (Ln(LTD)) and the logarithm of  short-term debt 
(Ln(STD)), respectively. While column 4 analyzes the impact of  the NID on the assets side, using the logarithm 
of  total assets (Ln(Total Assets)) as the dependent variable.  Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for 
Belgian firms and zero otherwise; Post is a dummy variable equal to one for the post-treatment period (2006-
2011), zero otherwise; interaction term between Treated and Post dummies captures the impact of  the NID; 
Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one for the post-crisis period (2008-2011), zero otherwise. The industry 
dummy variables are based on two-digit SIC codes. The regressions are estimated by Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) cross-section weights. The sample period is 2002-2011. Coefficients and standard errors are reported. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 LN(Total Debt)  LN(LTD)  LN(STD)  Ln(Total Assets)  
Treated*Post -0,2156 *** -0,0885  -0,3624 *** -0,1707 *** 
 
(0,0545)  (0,0601)  (0,0674)  (0,0331)  
Post 0,3479 *** 0,2782 *** 0,2889 *** 0,3276 *** 
 
(0,0485)  (0,0659)  (0,0568)  (0,0294)  
Crisis 0,1805 *** 0,0819  0,1086 * 0,0880 *** 
 
(0,0473)  (0,0610)  (0,0555)  (0,0289)  
Constant 11,0778 *** 10,0037 *** 10,6999 *** 12,5664 *** 
 
(0,2110)   (0,3548)   (0,1696)   (0,1387)   
Observations 2591  2591  2569  2590  
Number of  firms 264  264  264  264  
Adjusted R-squared 0,283  0,242  0,148  0,529  
Industry Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
5.3. Robustness tests 
In this subsection, we used several robustness tests to ensure that main results do not depend 
on the matching procedure or the sample. The configuration used is similar to Column 4 in 
Table 2 and the results are reported in Table 4. 
In Columns 1 and 2 of  Table 4, we changed the number of  matched firms to evaluate if  the 
number of  matches influences the results.  In Column 1 and 2 we used one and five matches 
for each Belgian company, respectively. The results show a negative and significant impact 
of  the tax change on corporate leverage, with a coefficient for the interaction term of  -
0.0189 for Column 1 and -0.0205 for Column 2. This indicates that the results are consistent 
and do not depend on the number of  matches. 
To ensure that the matching procedure did not change the regression results, in the third 
column of  Table 4 we used unmatched data, using the full sample of  French companies. The 
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regression results continue to show a negative and significant impact of  the NID on leverage, 
which indicates that the matching procedure does not change the main results. 
Finally, in Column 4 we used an additional control group of  German companies, to ensure 
that the results are not country-specific. When we used German companies as control group, 
we found again a negative coefficient for the interaction term, but weaker compared to that 
obtained for identical specification for the French control group (-0.0106 versus -0.0178). In 
addition, the results are only significant at the 10% level. 
Thus, the change in the number of  matched firms, the use of  unmatched sample and the 
consideration of  a different control group does not change the main results, indicating that 
the results obtained are robust.   
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Table 4: Robustness tests 
 This table reports the results of  the leverage regression, using a difference-in-difference strategy to 
test the robustness of  the results. The robustness checks of  columns 1 and 2 use one or five control companies 
for each treatment company, respectively. Column 3 is based on full sample of  French firms. Column 4 uses 
German firms as a control group. The dependent variable is Leverage defined as total debt divided by total 
assets. Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for Belgian firms and zero otherwise; Post is a dummy variable 
equal to one for the post-treatment period (2006-2011), zero otherwise; interaction term (Treated*Post) cap-
tures the impact of  the NID; Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one for the post-crisis period (2008-2011), 
zero otherwise; Profitability (PROF) is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
divided by total assets; Tangibility (TANG) is defined as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; 
Size (SIZE) defined as the logarithm of  total assets; Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) is defined as depreciation, 
depletion and amortization divided by total assets; GDP per capita (GDPpc) is measured by Word Bank, GDP 
growth per capita (GDPpc growth) is the annual percentage of  GDP per capita growth as measured by the 
World Bank and Inflation is the annual percentage of  inflation in consumer prices as measured by the World 
Bank. The industry dummy variables are based on two-digit SIC codes. The regressions are estimated by Gen-
eralized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights. Coefficients and standard errors are reported. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
  1 Match   5 Match   Full Sample Germany   
Treated * Post -0,0189 *** -0,0205 *** -0,0199 *** -0,0106 * 
 
(0,0069)  (0,0057)  (0,0053)  (0,0063)  
Post 0,0102  0,0103 * 0,0071  -0,0111 ** 
 
(0,0086)  (0,0056)  (0,0045)  (0,0050)  
Crisis -0,0042  -0,0191 *** -0,0164 *** -0,0173 *** 
 
(0,0083)  (0,0052)  (0,0042)  (0,0049)  
PROF -0,3792 *** -0,4758 *** -0,3784 *** -0,3736 *** 
 
(0,0271)  (0,0186)  (0,0139)  (0,0155)  
TANG 0,1891 *** 0,2562 *** 0,2504 *** 0,3754 *** 
 
(0,0190)  (0,0085)  (0,0078)  (0,0114)  
GRO 0,0258 * 0,0308 *** 0,0333 *** 0,0121  
 
(0,0154)  (0,0085)  (0,0060)  (0,0099)  
SIZE 0,0134 *** 0,0099 *** 0,0134 *** 0,0046 *** 
 
(0,0013)  (0,0007)  (0,0006)  (0,0009)  
NDTS 0,4482 *** 0,3597 *** 0,4796 *** -0,1092  
 
(0,1028)  (0,0518)  (0,0353)  (0,0674)  
ln(GDP per capita) -0,0317  -0,0590 *** -0,0174  0,0024  
 (0,0203)  (0,0146)  (0,0119)  (0,0112)  
GDP per capita _ growth -0,0007  -0,0072 *** -0,0051 *** -0,0017 ** 
 (0,0020)  (0,0013)  (0,0011)  (0,0007)  
Inflation 0,0048  0,0149 *** 0,0112 *** 0,0060 ** 
 (0,0032)  (0,0024)  (0,0020)  (0,0026)  
Constant 0,3636 * 0,6896 *** 0,1844  0,0428  
  (0,2128)   (0,1505)   (0,1232)   (0,1193)   
Observations 1292  3861  4805  2584  
Number of firms 132  396  497  264  
Adjusted R-squared 0,613  0,485  0,423  0,479  
Industry Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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6. Conclusion 
The most of  tax systems around the world allow the deduction of  interest for tax purposes, 
while the same is not true for equity. Thus, it is more favourable for companies to use debt 
financing to finance their investments, which can lead to excessive leverage by companies. In 
this wise, the aim of  this dissertation is to study the impact of  reduction of  the tax discrim-
ination between debt and equity on corporate capital structure. For this, we use an exogenous 
variation in the Belgian tax legislation in 2006, called notional interest deduction. It consists 
in the introduction of  a tax deduction for equity due to the application of  a notional interest 
rate on equity, which reduces the tax discrimination between debt and equity. 
To analyse the impact of  this measure on corporate leverage, we use a difference-in-differ-
ence regression which compares the evolution of  the leverage ratio of  Belgian companies 
with a control group of  French companies before and after the introduction of  the NID. In 
addition, we use panel data and a GLS cross-section weights estimator. The sample is com-
posed of  2 281 (310 Belgian and 1 971 French) listed on the Euronext Liffe Brussels for 
Belgium and on the Euronext Liffe Paris for France during the period of  2002 to 2011. 
The main results of  this study indicate that the reduction of  the tax discrimination between 
debt and equity have a significant impact on the corporate capital structure decisions. The 
analysis on NID introduction in Belgium showed that the tax deduction for equity had a 
negative and significant impact on corporate leverage ratio. However, the decrease in leverage 
ratio can be due to the decrease in debt or the increase in assets, for that reason it is important 
to study the factors that drive the change in leverage.  The results indicate that this change is 
driven by a decline in debt, mainly due to the reduction of  short term debt, and not by an 
increase of  assets. These findings indicate that the reduction in leverage is more likely to be 
driven by the decrease in the relative debt attractiveness. Finally, we do additional robustness 
tests to evaluate if  the main results do not depend on the matching procedure or the sample, 
which confirmed the findings. 
Overall, the results contribute to the literature about the impact of  the taxes on corporate 
capital structure. They suggest that the reduction of  the tax discrimination between debt and 
equity can be an important tool for reducing leverage ratio in countries with high levels of  
corporate leverage. 
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However, the sample used is reduced which may limit our study. Moreover, with the recent 
introduction of  ACE systems in several countries, it would be important to evaluate the 
impact of  these implementations on corporate capital structure, which could be further ex-
plored in future researches. 
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